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A MODEL FOR DETERMINING THE PUBLICATION 
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 552(a)( 1) OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be deter-
mined by a rule, because every course of action can be made 
out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can 
be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made 
out to confiict with it. And so there would be neither accord 
nor confiict here. 1 
During a typical albeit hectic week, a government agency pro-
duces press releases, advisory opinions, adjudicative opinions, 
orders without opinions, staff manuals containing directives to 
regional agency members, written memos from the agency head 
to the staff concerning the interpretation of statutes, similar 
memos written to only one staff member-the list could go on 
endlessly. 2 The Administrative Procedure Act8 (AP A) attempts 
1 L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 81e (1945). 
I See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5:11 (2d ed. 1978). 
• 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976) [hereinafter cited as APA]. The revelant statutory provi-
sions are the following: 
§ 651. Definitions 
(4) "rule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or 
prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice re-
quirements of an agency . . . . 
(5) "rule making" means agency process for formulating, amending, or re-
pealing a rule . . . . 
§ 662. Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, 
and proceedings [note: § 552 constitutes the Freedom of Information Act] 
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows: 
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal 
Register for the guidance of the public-
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by 
law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general appli-
cability formulated and adopted by the agency .... 
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms 
515 
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to impose an order upon the multiplicity of agency actions by 
providing a hierarchical taxonomy for categorizing such actions. 
The AP A's system for rulemaking consists of three separate 
groupings of agency actions: actions subject to the pre-adoption 
notice and comment requirements of AP A section 553 ("notice 
and comment" rule);" actions subject to the post-adoption publi-
cation requirements of AP A section. 552(a)(l) ("publication" 
rule);11 and actions subject to the post-adoption public inspection 
requirement of APA section 552(a)(2) ("availability" rule).8 
Prior to the adoption of a "rule," an agency must announce 
the "rulemaking" and formulate such a rule in notice and com-
thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely 
affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so 
published. For the purposes of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to 
the class of persons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register 
when incorporated by reference therein with the approval of the Director of the 
Federal Register. 
(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for 
public inspection and copying-
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as 
well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases; 
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been 
adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; 
and 
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect 
a member of the public; 
unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale. To the 
extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, 
an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an 
opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction. How-
ever, in each case the justification for the deletion shall be explained fully in 
writing. Each agency also shall maintain and make available for public inspec-
tion and copying current indexes providing identifying information for the pub-
lic as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967, and re-
quired by this paragraph to be made available or published .... A final order, 
opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that 
affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by 
an agency against a party other than an agency only if-
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as 
provided by this paragraph; or 
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof. 
§ 553. Rule making 
(b) ... 
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not 
apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice .... 
• See note 3 supra. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976) provides for receipt, consideration, and 
publication of public comments. 
• See note 3 supra. 
• Id. 
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ment proceedings.7 The APA hierarchy creates an exemption 
from such proceedings for "interpretive rules" and "general 
statements of policy." According to the publication rule, an 
agency must currently publish these interpretations and policy 
statements in the Federal Register. Finally, some agency results, 
including "those statements of policy and interpretations which 
have been adopted by the agency and not published in the Fed-
eral Register," need only be made available for public 
inspection. 
This article addresses the question of when the publication 
rule requires an agency to publish its results in the Federal Reg-
ister, particularly "interepretations of general applicability" and 
"statements of general policy." The vast number of recent cases 
involving violations of the publication rule provide ample· impe-
tus for settling this controversy.8 Of striking significance is the 
• See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (1976). _ 
• See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). Morton furnishes a good example of 
how courts may declare agency actions void for lack of publication in the Federal Regis-
ter. Unfortunately, the opinion is also indicative of how a court can arrive at such a 
conclusion through circuitous reasoning. 
In Morton, two full-blooded Indians who lived off a reservation b'ut in an Indian com-
munity near the reservation sought general assistance benefits from the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) under the Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), which authorized the BIA, 
under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, to supervise and expend appropri-
ated funds for the benefit, care, and assistance of Indians throughout the United States 
for specified purposes. Under a rule found in the BIA staff manual which limited eligibil-
ity for such benefits to Indians living "on reservations," the BIA denied the request for 
benefits. In an unanimous opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court 
held that such benefits could not be denied under the circumstances because the "on 
reservations" limitation in the BIA's manual had not been published in the Federal Reg-
ister as required by APA § 552(a)(l) and by the Bureau's own policies. 415 U.S. at 236. 
Although Morton reached a fair conclusion, the Court's reasoning lacked ~ principled 
progression from premises to conclusion. See Davis, Administrative Law Surprises in 
the Ruiz Case, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 823, 843-44 (1975). The confusion in the Court's analy-
sis concerns the classification of the hidden BIA rule within the AP A taxonomy of 
agency actions. The Court's discussion clearly indicated that the BIA rule was an "inter-
pretive" rule, 415 U.S. at 237; the Court, however, stopped short of explicitly branding 
the hidden rule as such. On the contrary, the characterization of the BIA rule as an 
interpretation would fail to conform to the Court's depiction of the manual as "an inter-
nal-operations brochure intended to cover policies that 'do not relate to the public.'" Id. 
at 235. If the manual represented nothing more than such a limited brochure, § 552(a)(2) 
requires only that the "on reservations" rule be made available to the public. 
Unfortunately, the APA provides little guidance for arriving at such conclusions be-
yond a shapeless taxonomy which only fosters confusion among the courts trying to ap-
ply such criteria. Nonetheless, courts are bound to try to follow the statutory provisions 
of the AP A. This article proposes a model which offers the necessary guidance to such 
courts. See part II infra. 
For other cases involving violations of the publication rule, see, e.g., United States v. 
Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978) (where defendants had 
actual notice of instruction barring unauthorized entry onto the island of Kahoolawe, 
they could be prosecuted even though the instruction had not been published in the 
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broad spectrum across which these cases stretch: food stamp 
cases,9 prison matters,10 and immigration disputes.11 The list is 
as broad as the range of administrative practice. 
Part I examines the characteristics found in all policy state-
ments and interpretations without regard to their generality. 
Thereafter, the focus shifts to "generality," which distinguishes 
the publication rule from the availability rule. The predominant 
judicial test in this regard, the significant impact test, is closely 
scrutinized and rejected. Part II presents a model for determin-
Federal Register); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1977) (the 
EPA's regulation governing cooling water intake structures was unenforceable for want 
of proper publication where the development document had not been published in the 
Federal Register); Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977) (the Secretary of Agri-
culture's instruction requiring that rent subsidies paid by HUD be included as "income" 
for food stamp purposes was void for failure to publish the instruction in the Federal 
Register); Neighborhood Legal Servs. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Conn. 
1979). In Neighborhood Legal Services, the legal services agency had not been adversely 
affected by the lack of publication of material for funding migrant worker programs, so 
there was no basis under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for a judgment requir· 
ing the legal services corporation to consider a new application. The agency was entitled 
to an injunction, however, requiring the corporation to publish in the Federal Register its 
statement of general policy concerning the definition of "migrant worker" and the nwn-
ber of migrant workers that had to be within the applicant's service area in order to 
receive funding; Hwnan Resources Management, Inc. v. Weaver, 442 F. Supp. 241 
(D.D.C. 1978) (preliminary injunction against the Small Business Administration was 
precluded because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendants' actions were un-
lawful on the ground that the actions were taken pursuant to procedures not published 
in the Federal Register); Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (a nonprofit 
California corporation providing legal services to indigents suffered an "injury in fact" as 
a result of the Secretary of Agriculture's failure to publish an instruction, and the corpo-
ration therefore had standing); Dean v. Butz, 428 F. Supp. 477 (D. Hawaii 1977) (a letter 
promulgated by the defendants which contained a requirement that payments be in-
cluded as income was of general applicability and, hence, was invalid without publication 
in the Federal Register); United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. 
Pa. 1977) (an administrative decision to rescind a prior operating instruction of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service had to be published under the FOIA; and where it 
was not published, persons without notice could not be adversely affected); Lewis v. 
Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652 (D.N.M. 1976) (the Indian Health Service program had no 
effect for lack of publication in the Federal Register). 
• See, e.g., Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977); Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. 
Supp. 628 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Dean v. Butz, 428 F. Supp. 477 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
10 See, e.g., Cox v. Department of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1978) (5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(2) (1976), which lists records that must be made available for public inspection 
and copying, did not require disclosure of the Drug Enforcement Administration's "vio-
lator classification identifier," since disclosure would significantly impair the DEA's law 
enforcement efforts); Ramer v. Saxbe, 522 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (federal prison in-
mates brought an action challenging the regulations of the Bureau of Prisons on the 
ground that the regulations had not been validly published in compliance with the APA; 
held that the Bureau of Prisons was an "agency" within the definition of the APA). 
11 See, e.g., Mehta v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 574 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(the Board of Immigration Appeals' individual decisions do not have to be published in 
the Federal Register although they must be made available for public inspection); 
United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
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ing when the publication rule requires publication of an agency 
interpretation or policy statement. The model maintains the 
AP A hierarchical taxonomy but goes beyond the strict meaning 
of the statutory terms in order to implement the AP A policies of 
agency consistency and avoidance of surprise to the public. A 
proposed necessary condition for publication is that the agency 
direct the "general" action towards a class of persons. The core 
component of the model focuses upon whether the policy or in-
terpretation diverges from the agency's corpus of values, beliefs, 
and positions. This article maintains that if examination uncov-
ers such divergence, publication in the Federal Register should 
be required. In borderline cases, the agency's experience with 
prior judicial reactions to its interpretations and statements 
should be examined. If, in light of this experience, it is likely 
that a court will defer to the agency policy or interpretation, di-
vergence notwithstanding, this estimation weighs in favor of 
publication. In sum, the model's elements of generality, diver-
gence, and deference provide the means for effectuating the cen-
tral AP A policies. 
I. DEFINITIONS OF APA TAXONOMIC TERMS 
In order to prevent courts from voiding agency actions for 
publication rule violations, agencies must determine whether the 
AP A requires agencies to formulate a policy through notice and 
comment proceedings or whether they need only publish or 
make the statement of policy available to the public. The key 
statutory terms in the APA hierarchy, therefore, require clarifi-
cation, particularly the two agency actions which the publication 
rule denominates "statements of general policy" and "interpre-
tations of general applicability."12 
11 These two terms demand close scrutiny for several reasons. First, 5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(l)(D) (1976) requires that an agency publish three types of results; these two 
types of action, which are exempt from notice and comment proceedings, and "substan-
tive rules" which are not exempt from such proceedings. Since the latter undergo pre-
adoption notice and comment proceedings, they are less likely to surprise the public. 
Second, courts spend a considerable amount_ of time trying to determine the meaning of 
these terms within the context of the publication rule. See, e.g., Anderson v. Butz, 550 
F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1977) ("there is still difficulty determining when publication in 
the Federal Register is required by the FOIA"). Commentators also find it extremely 
difficult to understand the requirements and the language of the publication rule. Profes-
sor Davis comments as follows: 
This question [of what rules, policies, and interpretations must be published in 
the Federal Register] is (a) highly practical, but (b) probably cannot be an-
swered except in vague terms. . . . for instance, what is the answer to the simple 
question whether all interpretive rules must be published or whether some need 
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A. Definitions Without Regard to "Generality" 
The following discussion establishes the characteristics found 
in all policy statements and interpretations. 
1. Policy statements-The AP A exempts "general statements 
of policy" from notice and comment proceedings. 18 Agencies 
must publish "statements of general policy" in the Federal Reg-
ister .14 "Statements of policy" need only be made avilable for 
public inspection.16 . One mystery surrounding the AP A taxon-
omy is whether general statements of policy represent the same 
agency actions as statements of general policy. 
The better view equates the notice and comment rule's gen-
eral statements of policy with the publication rule's statements 
of general policy. Support for this position comes from the fact 
that the legislative history of the AP A never attempts to distin-
guish between such actions. 18 Furthermore, at least one court 
has explicitly assumed their substantial equivalence.17 Finally, 
the AP A hierarchy is sensible only under the equivalence view. 
Although the notice and comment rule exempts general state-
ments of policy from such proceedings, these statements should 
be published for the public's protection. Such publication, how-
ever, is statutorily required under the publication rule only if 
general statements of policy are equivalent to statements of gen-
eral policy. 
An argument supporting the non-equivalence of these actions 
concentrates on the placement of the modifier "general." In the 
not be? ... The best answer to [this] question is that probably no judge, no 
administrator, no practitioner, and no commentator knows the answer. Even 
though the question of what must be published is so highly practical, the mean-
ing of the FOIA on this question remains about as vague after more than a dec-
ade as it was when it was enacted. 
1 K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 5:11, at 341. For Professor Davis' view on the type of general 
approach that should be taken to solve this problem, see note 47 infra. 
1
• 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1976). 
14 Id. § 552(a)(l)(D) (1976). 
10 Id. § 552(a)(2)(B) (1976). 
18 See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 2D SESS., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT 18 (Comm. Print 1946). 
17 In United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 986 n.18 (E.D. Pa. 1977), 
the court added this footnote to its discussion: 
Whether a "general statement of policy" under § 553 is the same as a "statement 
of general policy" under § 552 is an intriguing mystery which no case seems to 
help solve. Nor does Professor Davis seem to discuss the problem. See K. Davis, 
Administrative Law of the Seventies §§ 3A.7, 5.03, at 72-75, 146-61 (1976). We 
assume that there is no material difference between the two terms, if indeed 
Congress intended any difference at all. 
But see Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D.N.M. 1976); and note 42 infra. 
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notice and comment rule exemption, this argument is that "gen-
eral" modifies "statement" whereas in the publication rule "gen-
eral" modifies "policy." Thus, the different placement of the 
modifier produces contrasting results. A general statement of 
policy might concern a very specific policy stated generally while 
a statement of general policy could never concern a specific 
policy. 
The proponent of the non-equivalence view must confront 
some curious results. The AP A exempts "general statements of 
policy" from notice and comment proceedings. Under the non-
equivalence view, however, these general statements need be 
neither published nor made available to the public. The non-
equivalence view opens a large gap in the AP A hierarchy since 
general statements of policy fall outside of the notice and com-
ment, publication, and availability rules. Such a result clearly 
undermines the effectiveness of the AP A publication scheme. 
According to the better view, the difference in language does not 
yield a difference in treatment. These policy statements, there-
fore, while exempt from notice and comment proceedings, 
should be subject to mandatory post-adoption publication in the 
Federal Register. 
The legislative history of the APA does not reveal any con-
gressional attempt to define precisely what serves as a policy 
statement. The 1947 Attorney General's Manual on the APA 
represents the first attempt to provide such a definition.18 That 
publication defines "general statements of policy" as "state-
ments issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of 
the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discre-
tionary power."18 The 1974 Attorney General's Manual, which 
appeared after the most recent APA amendments, defines the 
availability rule's term "statements of policy" as "statements 
which articulate a settled course of action which will be pursued 
in a class of matters entrusted to agency discretion. "ao These 
two definitions highlight features in policy statements of all vari-
eties: such statements describe how an agency will use its discre-
18 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT (1947) [hereinafter cited at ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL]. The courts have 
deferred to the interpretations of the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL "because of the role 
played by the Department of Justice in drafting the legislation." Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) 
cf. Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 
(1961); United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 96 (1956) (deferring to administrative agen-
cies' construction of statutes relating to the agencies' operation). 
" ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL 30 n.3 (1947). 
10/d. at 21. 
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tionary power in the future. 
Several cases enumerate other factors exemplified by policy 
statements. 21 First, such statements do not exert a substantial 
impact upon parties. 22 If an agency action imposes rights and 
obligations on the affected party, this produces a substantial im-
pact upon the regulated population. Second, agencies often di-
rect such statements at their members, informing them of future 
policy with respect to certain discretionary matters. 28 Third, 
11 See notes 22-24 infra . 
.. Texaco v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969) is notorious for hav-
ing established the substantial impact test as the means for determining the scope of § 
553 exemptions from notice and comment proceedings. In Texaco the FPC had unilater-
ally promulgated an amendment to a published regulation, requiring for the first time 
that compound interest be paid on all the FPC-ordered refunds paid by natural gas com-
panies to consumers. Prior to the amendment, the FPC had discretion to order the pay-
ment of interest on a case-by-case basis. The Third Circuit held that the FPC order 
could not be termed a general statement of policy because it had a substantial impact on 
those regulated and because it "adopts a .substantive rule imposing ... rights and obli-
gations which an [affected person] has the burden of proving should not apply in any 
waiver or similar proceeding." Id. at 744. The court thus held that if an agency state-
ment imposes rights and obligations on the affected party, that action exerts a substan-
tial impact upon the regulated population. Such a statement, then, cannot be one of 
general policy since statements of general policy have no such substantial impact. See 
also Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1974) stat-
ing that an action is not a general statement of policy if "calculated to have a substantial 
effect on ultimate [discretionary) decision." 
For discussions and criticism of Texaco, see Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Cal. 1977); 
United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Lewis v. Wein-
berger, 415 F. Supp. 652 (D.N.M. 1976); Note, A Functional Approach to the Applica-
bility of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act to Agency Statements of Pol-
icy, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 430 (1976). 
•• In Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975), 
unadmitted Western Hemisphere aliens filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to 
restrain the implementation of a challenged policy of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service which would lead to their deportation. The policy in question stated that 
unadmitted Western Hemisphere aliens, married to American citizens, may extend the 
time for their voluntary departure until they can obtain visas. The court held that this 
policy did not deny equal protection to aliens married to resident aliens rather than to 
citizens. Moreover, the court held the policy was exempt from notice and comment pro-
ceedings because it represented a general statement of policy. Id. at 1030. Nonetheless, 
the court admitted that they found the definition of such an agency action "enshrouded 
in considerable smog." Id. 
In reaching its conclusion that this instruction represented a general statement of pol-
icy, the court construed the instruction to be a "statement by the agency of its general 
policy as a guideline for District Directors." Id. The court adopted Judge Friendly's 
characterization that "one of the values of the [general statement of policy is] the educa-
tion of agency members in the agency's work." H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 145-46 (1962), cited in 
Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, at 1030 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975) 
(emphasis deleted). The court also quoted from a commentary which noted that "[i]t 
may be that 'general statements of policy' are rules directed primarily at the staff of an 
agency describing how it will conduct agency discretionary functions, while other rules 
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such policy statements do not establish binding norms and do 
not finally determine the rights or issues which the statements 
address.2" 
2. Interpretations-Interpretive rules differ from substantive 
or legislative rules. While the formulation of the latter must be 
through notice and comment proceedings, interpretive rules fall 
within the exemptions to the notice and comment rule and re-
quire either publication or public availability. 211 Little disagree-
ment exists over the difference between interpretive and sub-
stantive rules.26 According to the dominant view, an interpretive 
rule represents the agency's interpretation of a statute or some 
prior guiding policy. Substantive rules, on the other hand, fill 
the gaps in statutes. Congress delegates authority to the agency, 
which then promulgates these rules pursuant to such power. The 
difference between interpretive and substantive rules according 
to the dominant view, then, lies in congressional delegation of 
authority to the agency to formulate binding substantive rules.117 
are directed primarily at the public in an effort to impose obilgations on them." Bonfield, 
Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpretive Rules 
and General Statements of Policy under the APA, 23 An. L. REV. 101, 115 (1970), cited 
in Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, at 1030 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 824 (1975). 
•• In Guardian Federal Sav. & Loan v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658 
(D.C. Cir. 1978), a federally chartered savings and loan association challenged regulations 
issued by the defendant agency without prior notice and comment procedures. The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, per Judge Leventhal, held that the 
challenged regulations encompassing audit specifications and auditor qualifications fell 
within § 553 exemptions from notice and comment. He noted that a critical test of 
whether a rule is a general statement of policy, and thus exempt from§ 553, is its practi-
cal effect in a subsequent administrative proceeding. A general statement of policy, he 
stated, does not establish a binding norm· and is not finally determinative of the issues or 
rights to which it is addressed. Id. at 666. The form of the regulation is not controlling; 
rather, its substance and effect will determine whether a rule is a general statement of 
policy. Finally, the court noted that the term "general" includes detailed requirements 
provided that they are of general, as contrasted with particular, applicability. Id. at 667. 
See part II A infra. 
•• 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(l)(D), (a)(2)(B), 553(b)(A), (1976) see note 3 supra. 
•• See, e.g., Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm., 554 F.2d 1140, 1152-54 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977), especially nn.24-26. In Joseph, Judge Tamm carefully spelled out the stan-
dard view regarding the distinction between interpretive and substantive rules. In sup-
port of the dominant view, see 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.8 (1978). In 
opposition to the dominant view, one commentator asserts that "a theoretical distinction 
between legislative and interpretive rules assumed to be present by Congress when it 
approved the APA has been effectively erased." Asimow, Public Participation in the 
Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 521, 563 
(1977). Although the dominant view may be under attack, courts continue to draw the 
distinction, thereby giving that view some measure of vitality. See note 27 infra. 
17 See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977). In Batterton, the Court noted that 
Congress expressly delegated to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare the 
power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes "unemployment" for the 
purposes of aid to families with dependent children-unemployed fathers eligibility. In 
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These two types of rules differ most in the standard of review 
courts employ to measure the rules' validity. On the whole, sub-
stantive rules possess the force of law and carry a strong pre-
sumption of validity. The courts possess greater power in re-
viewing interpretive rules. 28 The legislative history of the AP A 
suggests viewing interpretive rules as "merely interpretations of 
statutory provisions [which] are subject to plenary judicial re-
view .... "29 When reviewing such actions court may substitute 
its own judgment on questions of law underlying the interpretive 
rule. As will be discussed, however, courts often def er to an 
agency's interpretive rules. 80 
B. Definitions Keyed to "Generality" 
The consensus on what constitutes an interpretation or policy 
statement is of minimal value when the focus shifts to under-
standing the requirement of "generality," which distinguishes 
the publication rule from the availability rule. 81 Unfortunately, 
the APA's legislative history and the Attorney General's Man-
ual provide little guidance on the problem of the meaning of 
"generality. "82 
exercising that delegated authority the Secretary adopted regulations with legislative ef-
fect. See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In dealing with guide-
lines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that differed from the 
Court's interpretation of a statute, the Court noted that Congress did not confer upon 
the EEOC the authority to promulgate rules or regulations. Hence, the EEOC rules were 
accorded less weight because of a lack of delegated authority to make such rulings. 
•• See note 27 supra; Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 
1250 (3d Cir. 1978) (a nonprofit organization owning and operating a skilled nursing fa-
cility challenged the application to it of medicare depreciation recapture regulations; 
held that retroactive application of the regulation would be improper). 
19 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 16, at 18. 
~· See part II C infra. 
•• See, e.g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), modi-
fied on other grounds, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The district court compared the 
publication and availability rules and commented: 
Read together these provisions can only mean that interpretations of general 
applicability are to be published in the Federal Register while all other interpre-
tations adopted by an agency, i.e., those not of general applicability, are to be 
made available to the public, albeit they need not be published. Thus, even 
those interpretations of very unique applicability must be made available under 
the Act. 
Id. at 1303-04. No one would accuse this passage of being overly illuminating. Yet Pro-
fessor Davis commented that this case and quotation present "a good judicial treatment 
of the problem whether § 552 requires publication of interpretive rules .... " K. DAVIS, 
supra note 2, § 5:11, at 342. 
II The 1947 and 1974 definitions from the two ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUALS fail to 
distinguish adequately statements of general policy from statements of policy. See text 
accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra. In order to know when an agency must publish any 
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1. The significant impact test- The significant impact test, 
articulated by Lewis v. Weinberger, 33 represents the predomi-
nant judicial perspective through which the requirement of gen-
erality gains meaning. 34 Lewis established the following test in 
determining whether a policy or interpretation must be pub-
lished or merely made available to the public: "A policy state-
ment is not qualified as 'general' nor is an administrative inter-
pretation deemed to be 'of general applicability' if: (1) only a 
clarification or explanation of existing laws or regulations is ex-
pressed; and (2) no significant impact upon any segment of the 
public results."311 The test directs attention to the "causal" fea-
tures of the interpretation or policy statement. If an action ex-
erts a significant impact upon some segment of -society and goes 
beyond a mere clarification of existing law, then the publication 
rule requires publication of that result. Mere interpretations and 
policy statement rather than making it available for inspection, the agency must know 
when such statements announce general policy as opposed to non-general policy. The 
1947 and 1974 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL'S definitions overlap substantially and thus 
fail to provide any insight for any relevant distinctions. Moreover, neither the APA legis-
lative history nor the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL distinguish between specific inter-
pretations and those of general applicability. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JuorcARY, supra 
note 16; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL (1947), (1967), (1974). 
•• 415 F. Supp. 652 (D.N.M. 1976). In Lewis, American Indian plainti1fs brought an 
action attacking the policy and practice of the Indian Health Service (IHS) of denying 
contract medical care to off-reservation Indians. The court held that the IHS policy 
found in a memorandum available at IHS offices had no effect for either of two reasons: 
lack of publication in the Federal Register as required by § 552 (a)(l)(D) and lack of 
issuance in accordance with § 553 notice and comment proceedings. 
In determining that the IHS policy had to be published as a " 'statement of general 
policy' within the meaning of § 552(a)(l)(D)," the court established the significant im-
pact test. Id. at 659. See text accompanying note 35 infra. After deciding the action 
violated publication rule requirements, the court determined that the action should have 
been promulgated through notice and comment proceedings. Utilizing the test enunci-
ated in Texaco v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969), for determining § 553(b)(A) exemp-
tions, the court held that no exemptions applied to the IHS policy since "[t]he policy in 
question effects a substantial change in existing statutes and regulations ... " 415 F. 
Supp. at 661 (emphasis added). See note 22 supra for a discussion of Texaco. Although 
the court admitted that the IHS policy was a § 552 statement of general policy, it also 
said that the IHS policy was not 1i general statement of policy for § 553 purposes; thus, 
Lewis appears to provide support for the non-equivalence position. See part I A 1 supra. 
14 Although the Lewis holding rested upon alternative grounds, subsequent courts 
have borrowed exclusively that portion of Lewis which established the significant impact 
test for § 552 purposes. Courts in the Ninth Circuit utilize the Lewis test more than any 
other circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1977); Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 
653 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Dean v. Butz, 428 F. Supp. 477, 480 (D. Hawaii 1977) ("This 
[Lewis] test was recently adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Anderson v. 
Butz . ... "). The Lewis test has been used in other circuits as well. See, e.g., Appalach-
ian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 1977) . 
.. Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D.N.M. 1976). 
526 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 13:3 
statements of policy,38 which require only public availability, fail 
to meet the two requirements of Lewis. These actions only clar-
ify existing law and fail to exert a significant impact upon some 
segment of the public. 
2. Criticisms of the significant impact test- The criteria for 
evaluating the adequacy of any publication test stand out 
clearly. An adequate test must fulfill two functions. First, the 
test should provide direction to agencies so that they can make 
rational judgments on whether to publish an action or only to 
keep it available for inspection. Providing this direction, the 
"agency perspective," is the test's primary function. The other 
function of an adequate publication test, the "judicial perspec-
tive," comes into play only when someone challenges the 
agency's action. For this latter function, the test must facilitate 
a consistent judicial review of publication rule violations. 
Whether the significant impact test provides an adequate basis 
for distinguishing among agency actions for the purposes of the 
publication and availability rules is the key to evaluating its 
success. 
The major difficulty facing the Lewis test centers on the in-
ability to articulate adequately what constitutes "significant" 
impact. The interpretation of the statement 'action X has sig-
nificant impact upon Y' reduces to the identification and under-
standing of three variables: (a) the extent to which there must 
be impact upon the relevant group (e.g., "some impact" versus 
"heavy impact"); (b) the proportion of the relevant group af-
fected by the impact (e.g., "some number of the group" versus 
"a large number of the group");37 and (c) the frequency with 
which the impact affects the relevant group (e.g., "some of the 
time" versus "all of the time"). Given these variables, there exist 
eight logically possible interpretations of the statement 'action 
X has significant impact upon Y. >as 
"" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1976). 
•• This question of proportion is not the same as 'significant impact upon whom?' See 
note 40 infra. 
08 The eight logically possible interpretations are: 
(i) action X has some impact for some period of time upon some number of 
group Y; 
(ii) action X has some impact for some period of time upon a large number of 
group Y; 
(iii) action X has some impact all of the time upon some number of group Y; 
(iv) action X has some impact all of the time upon a large number of group Y; 
(v) action X has a heavy impact for some period of time upon some number of 
group Y; 
(vi) action X has a heavy impact for some period of time upon a large number 
of group Y. 
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The primary difficulty facing a proponent of the significant 
impact test is determining which. of these eight interpretations 
correspond to significant impact. Different lines will be drawn 
depending upon which one or combination of these three vari-
ables the proponent emphasizes. One might argue for that ver-
sion which results in the most publications, in view of the phi-
losophy behind the publication rule doing away with "secret 
law" and conducting agency actions in the public eye. 89 Every 
agency action, however, would seemingly satisfy this least re-
strictive version of the significant impact test. Such a broad in-
terpretation would expand the Federal Register to incredible 
proportions and make a mockery of the utility of the publication 
rule requirements. On the other hand, one could argue for that 
version which results in the fewest publications, on the theory 
that agencies need only publish their most important results in 
the Federal Register. Unfortunately, this stance would indubita-
bly result in agencies not publishing certain policies which ought 
to be brought to the public's attention for equitable reasons. 
Ultimately, the proponent of the Lewis test must attempt to 
justify the adoption of one or more of the versions which lie be-
tween the extreme versions. Principled arguments supporting 
such choices become difficult to produce. Such arguments more 
likely than not rest at best upon intuitive judgments and at 
worst upon arbitrary decisions. The various versions of the 
Lewis test, even at the intuitive level, are simply too close in 
meaning. •0 The subtle distinctions between the versions virtually 
(vii) action X has a heavy impact all of the time upon some number of group 
Y; 
(viii) action X has a heavy impact all of the time upon a large number of group 
Y. 
•• See note 56 infra. 
•
0 A further problem with the Lewis test lies in deciding to whom the test applies. The 
dilemma is whether the test concerns significant impact upon some segment of the gen-
eral public or significant impact upon some segment of the regulated public. The Lewis 
formulation focuses upon the former group. See note 33 supra. Several cases clearly indi-
cate, however, that courts are looking to the affected regulated public in order to mea-
sure significant impact. See, e.g., Sannon v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 458, 464 (S.D. 
Fla. 1978); Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 653 (E.D. Cal. 1977); United States ex rel. 
Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 985 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Suppose, for example, that an 
agency regulates a handful of oil producers in a particular matter. Under the strict ver-
sion of Lewis one can argue that an agency interpretation with significant impact on 
these few producers is not of general applicability because the interpretation does not 
have significant impact upon a segment of the general public. If a rule causes significant 
impact upon a segment of the general public, it seems to follow that the rule exerts 
significant impact upon the regulated public. As the above example demonstrates, how-
ever, the converse does not necessarily follow. 
The problem of to which group the Lewis test applies does not present an insurmount-
able hurdle to the survival of the significant impact test. Such considerations do under-
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ensure that agencies and courts will not be able consistently to 
reach the same conclusions concerning what constitutes signifi-
cant impact. To expect different actors in different situations to 
reach consistently similar conclusions about the application of 
these terms in naive. 
Every agency interpretation and statement exerts some im-
pact at some time on some group of people.41 The Lewis test 
attempts to impose a type of order upon a variety of circum-
stances which defy categorization in terms of varying "impact."·" 
score, however, the conceptual confusion which enshrouds the court's handling of this 
test. 
41 See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082 (Emer. 
Ct. App. 1978). The court criticized the use of the substantial impact test for determin-
ing when to apply § 553 exemptions. See note 22 supra. One can apply tl:ie court's criti-
cal comment to the instant context. The court complained that "[t]he substantial impact 
test is illogical because every significant interpretive rule choosing between two or more 
interpretations of a legislative rule or statute has an effect ("substantial impact") on the 
hopes, desires, expectations or beliefs of some of those regulated by the rule or statute." 
589 F.2d at 1094-95. 
•• One might argue that the Lewis test properly attempts to explicate the publication 
rule generally but fails to account adequately for all the phenomena such a test must 
cover. Rather than the Lewis significant impact test, a better publication test is a "drip-
down" theory predicated on the view that § 553 general statements of policy are 
equivalent to § 552 statements of general policy. The drip-down theory arises from the 
fact that judicial characterizations of .general policy statements indicate that such state-
ments do not have substantial impact upon the public although they do have a signifi-
cant impact upon the public. See Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740 
(3d Cir. 1969); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652 (D.N.M. 1976); and note 24 supra. 
These two conceptions of general policy statements do not necessarily contradict each 
other. If one assumes that "significant" impact differs from "substantial" impact by rep-
resenting less impact, the result is a drip-down theory relying upon this distinction. 
The drip-down theory has two components. The agency first determines if a statement 
of policy requires promulgation in notice and comment proceedings. If the policy state-
ment or interpretation exerts a substantial impact upon the public, then notice and 
comment proceedings must be undertaken. See, e.g., Sannon v. United States, 460 F. 
Supp. 458, 464 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (using the substantial impact test, the court determined 
that Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations regarding political asylum were 
not exempt from notice and comment proceedings.) The drip-down effect occurs when 
the agency concludes that the policy does not exert a substantial impact. The agency 
then judges whether the statement of policy exerts the lesser significant impact upon the 
public. If so, the agency deems the policy statement "general" and publishes it in com-
pliance with § 552(a)(l)(D). If there is not even a significant impact, the agency only 
makes the statement available to the public under § 552(a)(2)(B). 
The drip-down theory is sensible only if there is a quantifiable difference between a 
policy causing significant impact and one causing substantial impact. There are strong 
suggestions from the courts' treatment of § 552 violations as opposed to § 553 require-
ments that no fine lines are drawn between such varying impacts and apparently no 
court advocates the theory. Some might argue that the Lewis court's use of its own sig-
nificant impact test and the Texaco substantial impact test represents an early version 
of the drip-down theory. See note 33 supra. Such a contention fails, however, for two 
reasons. First, the drip-down theory depends upon a distinction between substantial im-
pact and the lesser significant impact. The Lewis court simply did not draw this distinc-
tion between varying impacts. Rather, the Lewis court's definition of significant impact, 
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Moreover, the language and legislative history of the APA do 
not support such a categorization.48 In judging the Lewis signifi-
cant impact test against the criteria for an adequate publication 
test, the test clearly fails to provide either the agency or judicial 
perspective. Ultimately, this test merely provides a shibboleth 
upon which agencies and courts hang their individual intuitions 
about right or wrong in a particular case. Such a reduction of 
jurisprudence to psychology should not prevail until there has 
been a more thorough attempt to explicate the AP A. 
II. A MODEL FOR DISTINGUISHING AGENCY ACTIONS FOR THE 
PURPOSES OF THE PUBLICATION AND AVAILABILITY RULES 
Part I A delineated characteristics found in all policy state-
ments and interpretations. The conclusions reached there re-
main intact even after the analysis in part I B. The rejection in 
part I B, however, of the significant impact test,4" the only 
415 F. Supp. at 659, is identical to the Texaco court's earlier definition of substantial 
impact. See note 22 supra. Second, the Lewis court's reasoning does not "drip-down" 
but rather "drips-up." The court first made the § 552 determination about publication 
and then considered the § 553 question of notice and comment. Such a method produces 
distorted results; every action which requires publication will also require formulation in 
notice and comment proceedings. Consequently, any attempt to characterize the Lewis 
opinion charitably as an early drip-down theory must fail. 
One might argue that even though courts fail to distinguish between significant and 
substantial impact, such a distinction can and should be drawn inasmuch as the drip-
down theory facilitates decisions about § 552 and § 553 actions. Such a theory fails, 
however, in the face of overhwelming obstacles such as those which plague the Lewis 
test. See part I B 2 supra. The major difficulty facing the drip-down theory is the inabil-
ity to articulate adequately what constitutes significant as opposed to substantial impact. 
There exist eight logically possible interpretations of the statements 'action X has signif-
icant impact upon Y' and 'action X has substantial impact upon Y.' It has been shown 
how difficult it is for a proponent of the "drip-down" theory determining which of these 
eight interpretations characterize which type of impact. See note 38 supra. 
There is a minimum of three variations of the drip-down theory concerning where to 
draw the line between significant and substantial impact. These three groups each desig-
nate a different variable as being most crucial in distinguishing among impacts. For ex-
ample, the group which views variable (b) (concerning the proportion of the group) as 
most crucial claims that interpretations (i),(iii),(v), and (vii) correspond to significant 
impact while (ii),(iv),(vi), and (viii) align with substantial impact. See note 38 supra. All 
of the arguments against the Lewis significant impact test apply equally well to the drip-
down theory. See part I B 2 supra. All impact tests suffer from the same inherent weak-
nesses, whether the impact is significant (Lewis), substantial (Texaco), or split between 
significant and substantial impact (drip-down). 
~ For criticisms of the failure of the substantial impact test to be grounded in the 
APA, see Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082 (Emer. 
Ct. App. 1978); Asimow, supra note 26, at 545-51. These sources are relevant to the 
significant impact test given the demonstrated similarities between significant and sub-
stantial impact. See note 42 supra. 
" See part I B 1 supra. 
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programmatic attempt to interpret the generality requirement of 
the publication rule, creates a vacuum. Three options are availa-
ble. One option is to abandon the distinction in generality be-
tween the publication and availability rules. Thereafter, all pol-
icy statements and interpretations can either be promulgated in 
notice and comment proceedings, published in the Federal Reg-
ister, or simply made available for inspection. Another option is 
to draw a different distinction between these rules. For example, 
only legislative rules, and announcements identifying those 
available policy statements and interpretations might be re-
quired to be published.46 A final option is to maintain the APA 
distinction of generality between the publication and availability 
rules. The challenge is to explicate this modifier successfully. 
This article integrates the last two options and presents a 
model for understanding the requirements of the publication 
and availability rules. The first · option's total abandonment of 
the distinction saddles the agencies and the public. with a hope-
less system. It is far too costly and time-consuming to require all 
policy statements and interpretations to go through notice and 
comment proceedings. The same complaints apply to mass pub-
lication in the Federal Register. On the other hand, merely mak-
ing policy statements and interpretations available for public in-
spection clearly subverts the AP A's commitment to openness.•• 
The second option of redrawing the distinction succeeds only if 
one who is intent on reforming the AP A confronts the fact that 
some policy statements and interpretations should be fully pub-
lished for the protection of the public. Ultimately, the APA hier-
archical taxonomy provides the best theoretical framework for 
realizing the objectives behind the AP A. To implement AP A 
policies fully while remaining sensitive to agency dynamics, how-
ever, requires that an explication of the publication rule must, 
for the purposes of reform, go beyond the notion of generality. 
Lewis offers one such creative attempt.47 This article rejects that 
•• This is suggested in Koch & Rubin, A Proposal For A Comprehensive Restructur· 
ing of the Public Information System, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1, 55-56 (1979). A different sug-
gestion is found in Asimow, supra note 26, at 573-84. Asimow advocates post-adoption 
notice and comment proceedings for general policy statements and interpretations. His 
suggestion would take effect only after such results have been published in the Federal 
Register as required by the publication rule. Hence, this article's model can be utilized 
by Asimow as a first step in the implementation of his reform. See part II infra. 
•• See note 56 infra . 
., Professor Davis characterizes the problem with the publication rule and Lewis's re-
sponse to that problem as follows: 
Since Congress has done no more than provide a framework which depends 
mainly on giving meaning to the word "general," and since analysis of such a 
term is not very promising, perhaps some judicial creativity is appropriate and 
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attempt but proposes to fill the vacuum with a model. 48 
A. A Threshold Inquiry: Generality 
Many analyses of the publication and availability rules assume 
that the beginning and end of any such analysis must focus upon 
the modifier "general" in the statutory expressions.49 Without 
doubt, scrutiny of this modifier represents the proper departure 
point for any analysis of the publication rule. But an analysis of 
the publication rule bases solely on the dissection of the modi-
fier "general" is overly simplistic. 
The detail in which an interpretation or policy statement ar-
ticulates a particular matter does not determine whether such 
entities are general.00 Rather, the focus should be on whether 
the agency directs actions and words towards the public or to-
wards a single specific party. If the latter is the agency's target, 
the policy or interpretation is usually not general. 61 The availa-
bility rule exempts from the publication requirements adjudica-
tive opinions62 and "instructions to staff that affect a member of 
the public .... "63 The agency presumably directs such actions 
of non-general applicability against one specific party. These ac-
tions, then, contrast with the general policies and interpretations 
of the publication rule. 64 
The modifier "general" in the publication rule refers to a rela-
tively straightforward agency determination. When an agency 
directs an action against a particular party, such an action is not 
general. Whenever an agency frames a policy or interpretation so 
that the agency action applies to all other similarly situated par-
ties, however, that action reaches the level of generality. This 
characterization, although accurate, is somewhat misleading. Ac-
cording to the availability rule, a non-general policy statement 
and interpretation "may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent 
even necessary ... In Lewis v. Weinberger ... the opinion of Judge Bratton is 
conservatively creative . . . The idea of "impact" cannot be extracted from the 
word "general" but it can be extracted from what Congress would have intended 
by "general" if it had expressed itself on the problem before the court. That 
approach to the problem is constructive and needed. 
K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 5:11, at 343-44. 
•• See parts II A-C infra. 
•• See note 31 supra. See also notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra. 
00 See note 24 supra. 
•• But see Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ruling that 
an "interpretation" includes a private ruling by the IRS.). 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1976). 
•• Id. § 552(a)(2)(C). 
"' Id. § 552(a)(l)(D). 
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by an agency against a party other than an agency if- (i) it has 
been indexed and either made available or published as pro-
vided by this paragraph .... "H This APA provision greatly di-
minishes any insight which the term "generality" provides in 
distinguishing the publication rule from the availability rule. In-
asmuch as an agency can use against parties any policy state-
ment or interpretation, without regard to generality, a publica-
tion test built solely upon generality fails to have any predictive 
effectiveness. Nonetheless, generality successfully serves as the 
starting point for an explication of the publication rule. The 
model advocated in this article focuses initial inquiry upon 
whether the agency directs its action towards a class of persons. 
If the action satisfies the model's necessary condition of general-
ity, the inquiry proceeds to additional components of the model. 
B. The Relationship of Agency Actions to the Agency's 
Corpus of Values, Beliefs, and Positions 
Consistency of agency action and the avoidance of surprise to 
the affected public represent the most important policies under-
lying the publication and availability rules.66 Consequently, 
these considerations must serve as the foundation from which 
the model arises. The model implements these policies by com-
paring an agency action to prior agency positions. To minimize 
potentially harmful surprise to the public, the model dictates 
•• Id. § 552 (a)(2) . 
.. See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 16, at 193-94, 198. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee noted: 
The bill is designed to afford parties affected by administrative powers a means 
of knowing what their rights are and how they may be protected. 
The first of these is basic [referring to the substance of the public information 
section of the APA], because it requires agencies to take the initiative in inform-
ing the public. 
The public information provisions of section 3 are of the broadest application 
because, while some functions and some operations may not lend themselves to 
formal procedure, all administrative operations should as a matter of policy be 
disclosed to the public except as secrecy may obviously be required or only inter-
nal agency "housekeeping" arrangements may be involved . . . The public infor-
mation requirements of section 3 are in many ways among the most important, 
far-reaching, and useful provisions of the bill. For the information and protec-
tion of the public wherever located, these provisions require agencies to take the 
mystery out of administrative procedure by stating it. The section has been 
drawn upon the theory that administrative operations and procedures are public 
property which the general public, rather than a few specialists or lobbyists, is 
entitled to know or to have the ready means of knowing with definiteness and 
assurance. 
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publication when the agency interpretation or policy statement 
diverges from the agency's corpus of values, beliefs, and 
positions.117 
Typically, an agency interpretation or policy statement di-
rectly relates only to some subset of the agency's corpus of val-
ues, beliefs, and positions. Consider an agency interpretation 'X' 
and the subset of agency values, beliefs, and positions {YI, ¥2, 
. . . , Yn J which generally concern the same agency matters as 
'X'. The following definitions can be given:118 
Def. 1. 
Def. 2. 
1gency action X diverges from l Y 1 , Y 2 , . . ., Y n if and only if Y 1 , Y 2 , ... , Y n entails not-X. 
Y 1 , Y 2 , ... , Y n if and only if l ·1gency action X converges with 
Y 1 , Y 2 , ... , Y n entails X. J 
A hypothetical example will help elaborate upon these defini-
tions.119 Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
grams provide monthly payments to low income families with 
children. The relevant statute dictates that in order for a family 
to be eligible for AFDC aid, either death or desertion must de-
prive the children of a parent.60 Agencies interpret this federal 
statute in accordance with the "substitute father" rule. In the 
•• This model does not pretend to aid directly in the determination of whether an 
action falls within the § 553 exemptions. The model presupposes the ability of the 
agency and the courts to distinguish between substantive rules subject to notice and 
comment proceedings and interpretations or statements of policy that § 553(b)(A) ex-
empts from such proceedings. See part I A supra. Furthermore, the model's purpose is 
not to distinguish interpretations from policy statements. The discussion in part I A, 
supra, indicates, however, a consensus on how to draw such a distinction. The model 
comes into play, as does the Lewis test, when an agency must decide if its interpretation 
or policy statement requires publication under § 552(a)(l)(D) or whether it need only be 
made available to the public under § 552(a)(2)(B). 
68 This account presupposes the following definition of "entailment": a group of state-
ments 'X' entails a given statement 'A', if and only if, A must necessarily be true when 
every member of X is true. 
•• This example does not precisely describe an actual sequence of events. However, the 
example does depict some of the events taking place in the administration of Aid for 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs. 
80 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1976) defines the term "dependent child," and 42 U.S.C. § 
606(b) (1976) defines the term "aid to families with dependent children." For the com-
prehensive regulations for AFDC programs, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (1976). 
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example, an agency issues, over a five month period, the follow-
ing five interpretations of the statute: 
(a) if a substitute father resides in a home, that family 
is ineligible for AFDC aid. 
(b) if an unrelated male resides in the house, that male 
is presumed to be a substitute father. 
(c) if a male uses a house as his mailing address, he is 
presumed to be a substitute father in that home. 
(d) if the mother's name and the male's name are on 
the house's deed as co-mortgagors, he is presumed to be a 
substitute father. 
(e) in order for any member of the household to receive 
AFDC aid, every member of the household must be eligi-
ble to receive AFDC aid. 
Subsequent to the issuing of interpretations (a) through (e), 
the same agency adopts the_ following interpretation of the stat-
ute in question: 
(0 any adult person living in the household is deemed 
to be contributing money to the children of the 
household. 
At an even later time the agency issues a further interpretation 
of the statute:81 
(g) an unrelated adult member of the household is not a 
part of the family for AFDC eligibility purposes unless 
that person has a legal duty to support the children. 
The question is which agency interpretations, if any, diverge 
from prior positions and require publication under the publica-
tion rule. 
Surprise to the public, which possibly results in harm, will 
arise at two points. The first point is when an agency offers its 
initial interpretation of a statute or its initial statement of how 
it will use its discretion in a new area. Thereafter, surprise arises 
when the agencies produce interpretations or policy statements 
which express sentiments different from their initial posture. In 
the hypothetical, interpretation (a) is the agency's first interpre-
11 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), which concerns the Alabama Department of 
Pension and Security's issuance of the substitute father rule. The Supreme Court held 
the Alabama regulation invalid by defining the term "father" to include a person who 
does not owe to the child a state-imposed legal duty of support. 
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tation of the statute. Certainly, (a) is a general interpretation, so 
the threshold hurdle is met. 62 There exist three possible findings 
· when measuring initial interpretation (a) against the divergence 
component. First, interpretation (a) diverges from the agency's 
corpus of values, beliefs, and positions, thus calling for publica-
tion in the Federal Register.63 Second, interpretation (a) does 
not diverge from the agency's corpus of positions and the availa-
bility rule requires public availability of (a).64 Finally, it might 
not be clear whether (a) diverges or converges with the agency's 
other positions. The likelihood of the last finding is great when 
dealing with the agency's initial policy statement or interpreta-
tion such as (a). 
The model erects a presumption in favor of publishing the ini-
tial general policy statement or interpretation. This presumption 
can be overcome only by a strong showing that the agency action 
converges with a prior set of agency positions. This presemption 
is met for (a), for example, if the agency utilizes the substitute 
father rule in interpreting all other eligibility statutes under 
their authority. The motive behind this presumption arises out 
of the strong AP A policies favoring agency consistency and the 
avoidance of surprise. 611 More likely than not, an initial general 
policy statement or interpretation will surprise the public. More-
over, given the action's newness, such a result will not obviously 
converge or diverge from other agency positions. Hence, in this 
hypothetical the model compels publication of interpretation (a) 
in the Federal Register. 
Surprise to the public also arises after the initial policy or 
interpretation when the agency "changes its mind." Consider the 
two subsequent agency interpretations (f) and (g) in the 
example. Clearly, the conjunction of all agency positions 
{ (a)&(b)&(c)&(d)&(e)} entails interpretation (0. In other words, 
(0 cannot be true if the previous interpretations (a) through (e) 
taken together are false. As such, interpretation (f) converges 
with the previous interpretati9ns (a) through (e). Therefore, the 
model does not require publication of (f). Just as clearly, inter-
pretation (g) diverges from the conjunction of all agency posi-
tions { (a)&(b)&(c)&(d)&(e)&(f) J. In other words, this conjunc-
tion entails the negation of interpretation (g). The conjunction 
of all the agency positions entails that "an unrelated adult mem-
•• See part II A supra. 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(D) (1976). 
84 Id. § 552(a)(2)(B). 
•• See note 56 supra. 
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her of the household is a part of the family unit for AFDC eligi-
bility purposes even if that person has no legal duty to support 
the children." Interpretation (g), however, makes the opposite 
claim. Hence, interpretation (g) diverges from the previous 
agency interpretations (a) through (f). Therefore, the model re-
quires publication of (g) in the Federal Register. 
There are some obvious objections to this central component 
of divergence. One might argue that it cannot adequately be de-
termined when an agency interpretation or policy statement di-
verges from or converges with the agency's other values, beliefs, 
and positions. Such an objection can be overcome, however, 
through repeated application and refinements of the model. For 
example, an agency interpretation or policy statement which 
merely clarifies a previous agency position will quite likely con-
verge with that position. To the extent that it converges, the 
model indicates that the agency need not publish the new result. 
Others will argue that the model is unacceptable because it 
goes beyond the strict meanings of the AP A taxonomy. Such an 
argument, however, actually points to the model's greatest virtue 
- the implementation of the AP A policies favoring agency con-
sistency and the avoidance of surprise to the public.88 A strict 
reliance on the infertile AP A legislative history and the face of 
the AP A's language results in the submersion of these important 
policy considerations. Accordingly, any useful explication of the 
publication rule must forge new ground by building upon the 
AP A policies. 87 
C. Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions 
When a person runs afoul of an agency interpretation or pol-
icy statement and requests that a court review the case's merits, 
a judicial decision to void the agency action mitigates to a great 
extent the harm to the challenging party. Over time and through 
interaction with the judicial system, agencies begin to expect 
certain types of judicial reactions. These agency expectations 
can help serve as a further basis for decisions about the publica-
tion rule requirements. The AP A concern over surprise injuries 
to the public relates to these considerations since greater harm 
befalls the party when the reviewing court upholds the agency's . 
action, in contrast to striking it down. If, in light of the agency's 
experience, a general policy statement or interpretation is the 
•• Id. 
97 See note 47 supra. 
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type of agency action to which a court is likely to defer, then 
this estimation weighs in favor of publishing the result in the 
Federal Register. This aspect of the model does not concern the 
actual divergence or convergence of an agency policy since this 
might or might not influence a court's specific deference deci-
sion.68 Rather, the model inquires whether this type of result 
falls into an area of agency actions which receive judicial defer-
ence, divergence notwithstanding. 
The "deference" component of the model does not occupy the 
central position held by divergence. As such, the component of 
judicial deference only cuts in favor of and never against publi-
cation. For example, if a general policy diverges but is not a 
likely candidate for judicial deference, the model nonetheless 
comples publication. Similarly, if a general policy clearly con-
verges but is a probable candidate for judicial deference, the 
model does not compel publication. The role of deference in the 
model is similar to that of a "tiebreaker"-the likelihood of judi-
cial deference compels publication in borderline and murky di-
vergence cases. 68 
•• See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974), where the Court noted that consis-
tency in the agency's interpretation of the statute will weigh in favor of the Court's 
deference. 
•• In assessing the potential for judicial deference to agency decisions, the agency must 
examine the courts' standards of review with regard to both interpretive rules and dis-
cretionary matters. Courts have the right to substitute their own judgment for the 
agency's on questions of law in interpretive rules. See part I A 2 supra. Courts will often 
defer, however, to the agency's position. Agency expertise is the factor most frequently 
relevant to the decision of deference. See, e.g., Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 801 
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Giles Lowery Stockyards v. Department of Agriculture, 565 F.2d 321, 
326 (5th Cir. 1977); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 576-85 
(1965); W. GELLHORN, C. BvsE & P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 311-18 (1979). Courts 
often defer to the agency when they recognize the agency action as growing out of a 
particular kind of agency expertise. See, e.g., Smithkline Corp. v. Food and Drug Admin-
istration, 587 F.2d 1107, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the court noted that courts will ordinarily 
exercise considerable deference to an agency's technical expertise and experience, partic-
ularly with respect to questions involving engineering and scientific considerations). An 
agency might view every decision it renders as an outgrowth of its expertise. As a result 
of even a limited interaction with the judicial system, however, the agency must learn 
that courts will reject such an extreme perspective. See, e.g., U.S. Lines v. Federal Mari-
time Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the court noted that agency expertise 
does not afford the agency absolute power; the existence of judicial review, although 
under a presumption favoring the agency's decision making, negates any notion that the 
deference to be afforded the agency's expertise in any particular field is absolute or its 
discretion unreviewable). Agencies must therefore be sensitive to the types of expertise 
to which the courts will defer. Otherwise this model component will be of less help to the 
agency. Apart from respect for an agency's expertise, a certain judicial attitude also cre-
ates a climate favorable to deference. The reviewing court need not find that the 
agency's interpretation is the only possible one or even that it represents the one the 
court would adopt in the first instance. See Belco Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Energy 
Reg. Comm'n, 589 F.2d 680, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The combination of these elements 
538 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 13:3 
CONCLUSION 
This article's model arises directly out of the fundamental 
AP A concerns favoring agency consistency and the avoidance of 
surprise to the public. 70 The agency or subsequent reviewing 
court should undertake their inquiry of the publication rule in 
accordance with the model's components. According to this arti-
cle's proposal, a policy statement or interpretation must be pub-
lished in the Federal Register if and only if: 
(i) the agency directs its action towards a class of per-
sons; and 
(ii) the agency action diverges from the agency's corpus 
of values, beliefs, and positions; 
also counting in favor of publication is a further element: 
(iii) in light of the agency's past experience, the agency 
action is of a type to which a reviewing court will likely 
defer. 
The model weighs these three components according to their 
respective degrees of importance in implementing APA policies. 
The generality requirement of (i) presents the starting point for 
publication rule analysis and acts only as a necessary condition 
for publication. The divergence component in (ii), representing 
the core of the entire model, serves as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for publication. Furthermore, if the policy statement 
leads to judicial deference to agency interpretations in many situations. 
Since policy state~ents give direction to the future exercise of agency discretion, the 
model component concerning judicial deference to policy statements must also take no-
tice of the standard of review for discretionary acts. The relevant statutory provisions 
state that the review provisions of the APA apply "except to the extent that ... agency 
action is committed to agency discretion." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976). Another section, 
however, allows a court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency actions, findings, and 
conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law." Id. § 706(2)(A). The Supreme Court resolved any conflict 
between these two provisions by construing § 701(a) narrowly in Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The Court established that there is 
preclusion of the review of discretionary action only in those rare instances when there is 
no law to apply. The Court delineated the procedure for review of agency action for 
abuse of discretion. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the administra-
tor's act falls within the scope of his authority. Second, the court must decide whether to 
characterize the agency action as "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law." This standard of review is a narrow standard and the 
court must find a clear error of judgment for there to be an "abuse of discretion." The 
court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. 
10 See note 56 supra. 
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or interpretation is the agency's initial effort in a particular area, 
the model erects a strong presumption favoring publication in 
the Federal Register. The deference element in (iii) serves as 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for publication. 
Rather, the model includes the deference element to help push 
difficult cases towards publication of the agency result. 
This model admittedly does not provide simplistic formulas 
which facilitate the blind application of "black letter" law. The 
model components, however, incorporate the general concerns of 
consistency and avoidance of surprise underlying the APA publi-
cation rule. Some might complain that this model provides no 
advantages over earlier efforts such as the Lewis test. Such a 
complaint fails to grasp the inherent limits of any theory. Any 
publication test will ultimately rest upon the intuitive judge-
ments of agency members and judges. The model in this article 
presents not only additional, but better guidelines for publica-
tion rule judgments. In an area of such great complexity as the 
APA, a model can only channel the parties' vision in the appro-
priate direction. If the parties stubbornly turn their heads after 
the model points them in the proper direction, the criticism 
must shift from the model methodology to the actors 
themselves. 
-Michael J. Kump 

